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The Meaning of the Holocaust for Bioethics
Abstract
Despite the central role played by the events leading to and during the Holocaust in bioethical discourse,
bioethicists have paid surprisingly little attention to examining the nature of the crimes committed in the
name of medicine and science, the moral rationales used to defend these crimes, or to the specifics of history
that do and do not find parallels in current public policies and moral disputes. The Center for Biomedical
Ethics at the University of Minnesota convened a conference on May 17-19, 1989, to examine some of these
issues. The conference focused on five major themes: What role did mainstream medicine and science play in
the creation of the Nazi state; What did German scientists and physicians think about and do in the name of
eugenics and euthanasia; What moral rationales were used to justify the involvement of medicine - and
science with genocide, euthanasia, and racism; Should scientists and physicians make any use of information
obtained from barbarous experiments conducted on innocent persons in concentration camps; and What is
the appropriate use of metaphors and analogies to the Nazi era in contemporary debates in bioethics?
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The Meaning of the 
Holocaust for 
Bioethics 
Despite the central role played by 
the events leading to and during the 
Holocaust in bioethical discourse, 
bioethicists have paid surprisingly 
little attention to examining the 
nature of the crimes committed in the 
name of medicine and science, the 
moral rationales used to defend these 
crimes, or to the specifics of history 
that do and do not find varallels in 
current public policies and moral 
disputes. The Center for Biomedical 
Ethics at the University of Minnesota 
convened a conference on May 17- 
19, 1989, to examine some of these 
issues. The conference focused on 
five major themes: What role did 
mainstream medicine and science 
play in the creation of the Nazi state; 
What did German scientists and 
physicians think about and do in the 
name of eugenics and euthanasia; 
What moral rationales were used to 
justify the involvement of medicine 
-and science with genocide, euthana- 
sia, and racism; Should scientists and 
physicians make any use of informa- 
tion obtained from barbarous exper- 
iments conducted on innocent ber- 
sons in concentration camps; and 
What is the appropriate use of 
metaphors and analogies to the Nazi 
era in contemporary debates in 
bioethics? 
Arthur Caplan, director of the 
Center for Biomedical Ethics, Robert 
Proctor, a historian at the New School 
for Social Research in New York, and 
Benno Muller-Hill, a geneticist at the 
University of Cologne, all argued that 
the racist underpinnings of Nazi 
ideology were firmly rooted in the 
racial hygiene theories prominent in 
German biology during the 1920s and 
30s-long before Hitler came to 
power. Proctor argued, moreover, that 
Nazism was not a philosophy 
espoused on the fringes of German 
medicine and science. Rather, it was 
an ideology with roots deep in the 
mainstream of German biology, 
medicine, and public health, and 
German physicians enrolled in the 
Nazi party at a rate three times higher 
than any other profession. 
Jay Katz, professor of law at Yale 
University, reviewed the atrocities 
perpetrated by Nazi scientists in the 
name of scientific research. Katz 
maintained that the ability to under- 
take murderous science was 
grounded in five norms: Obedience 
to authority; a commitment to racial 
superiority; a coilcern for the security 
and well-being of the state in time 
of war; a belief in the importance of 
scientific progress; and an ethos of 
professionalism that held that 
patients' interests were best served by 
trusting their doctors. Katz indicated 
that these latter two norms still linger 
in the contemporary scientific and 
medical research enterprise and 
threaten to erode respect for persons 
as subjects or patients in the interest 
of advancing knowledge. 
Caplan reviewed the moral ration- 
ales advanced by Nazi physicians at 
the Nuremburg trials. He noted that 
the German physicians who admin- 
istered the euthanasia program, 
supervised mass genocide, and con- 
ducted brutal experiments on Jews 
and other groups in concentration 
camps grounded their actions on 
utilitarian principles. The state was 
justified in demanding the sacrifice 
of the minority to advance the 
interests of the majority-only those 
"doomed to die" were selected for 
research involving lethal experi-
ments. Moreover, total war demanded 
both complete obedience to legiti-
mate state authority and conformity 
with the reauests of the state to obtain 
knowledge 'that could advance the 
war effort. Caplan noted that the 
doctrine of informed, voluntary 
consent that emerged in the Nurem- 
burg Code and later in the Helsinki 
Declaration was a direct response to 
these attempts at moral justification 
of 
Ruth Macklin, professor of bio- 
ethics at the Albert Einstein School 
of Medicine in New York, indicated 
there are important parallels between 
the rationales used to justify Nazi 
euthanasia programs and current 
arguments. But, she argued, concep- 
tual caution must be exercised in 
seeking parallels since not all instan- 
ces of termination of treatment 
constitute euthanasia. For the most 
part, Nazi policies involved active and 
involuntary euthanasia while contem- 
porary debates focus on voluntary 
acts of either active or passive 
euthanasia. Moreover. the moral 
justifications given by Nazi doctors for 
active euthanasia often differed from 
those invoked currently. However, 
Macklin noted that German physi- 
cians were particularly concerned 
about wasteful social expenditures on 
persons they viewed as not "cost-
worthy." She maintained that the 
most dangerous basis for slipping 
down the slope to abuse is when 
economics and ethics are systemat- 
ically confused. 
Perhaps the most emotionally 
trying portion of the conference 
centered in the ethics of using
u 
information obtained from innocent 
persons in concentration camps. 
Robert Pozos, a physiologist at the 
University of Washington, argued that 
Nazi research on hypothermia, while 
cruel and often fatal, was conducted 
in a manner capable of producing 
useful, important, and potentially life- 
saving results. Such experiments 
provide the only available source of 
information about exvosure to fatally 
cold temperatures. Pozos's claims 
provoked a heated and often passion- 
ate resDonse. Two survivors bf med- 
ical experiments at Auschwitz, Susan 
Seiler Vigorito and Eva Kor, argued 
that to use any data from Nazi 
experiments was to be complicit with 
absolute evil and lend dignity to the 
crimes. Others maintained that if the 
information could save lives, it ought 
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to be used, while Robert Berger, a 
survivor who became professor of 
surgery at Harvard, questioned the 
claim that the findings from hypo- 
thermia experiments had any scien- 
tific validity or were the sole source 
of information about exposure to cold 
temperatures. 
No consensus emerged about the 
ethics of using Nazi findings. But it 
did become clear that the issue of 
whether Nazi science should be used 
or cited is misstated. Nazi data and 
the claims of Nazi science in areas 
such as genetics, physiology, pathol- 
ogy, anthropology, and psychiatry 
have in the past been studied, cited, 
and absorbed into mainstream sci- 
ence with little comment It is impor- 
tant to ask why the question of using 
the findings of Nazi science did not 
surface until four decades after the 
collapse of the Third Reich.-Arthur 
L. Caplan 
Searching for 
International 
Consensus 

A group of thirty-five physicians 
and ethicists from ten countries has 
produced "The Appleton Consensus: 
Suggested International Guidelines 
for Decisions to Forgo Medical 
Treatment" (published in the March 
edition of the Journal of the Danish 
Medical Association). The guidelines 
apply to decisions in four different 
caie&ories:(1) competent patients or 
patients who executed an advance 
directive before becoming incompe- 
tent, (2) previously competent 
~atients. who have not issued an 
advance directive, (3) patients who 
have never been competent, 
(4) decisions in any of these catego- 
ries significantly influenced by scar- 
city of medical resources. 
The first section affirms that life- 
prolonging treatment should not be 
imposed on patients against their will; 
that advance directives by competent 
patients to reject treatment should be 
respected, that even while respecting 
treatment refusals, institutions have 
an obligation to continue to offer 
supportive care; and that requests, 
including advance directives, to 
continue life-prolonging treatment 
should also be respected except in 
certain specified circumstances-one 
of which is scarcity. In regard to 
requests for active euthanasia, the 
statement affirms in four terse sen- 
tences that there are conditions 
under which such requests may be 
justified; that this does not necessarily 
mean that such requests should be 
honored; that doctors have an obli- 
gation to "provide a peaceful, digni- 
fied, and humane death with minimal 
suffering"; and that at this time it 
would be "against the public interest" 
to legalize the "intentional killing of 
patients by physicians." This portion 
of the statement reveals important 
areas of disagreement from two 
directions. Three signatories dis-
sented, claiming that active euthana- 
sia is not only contrary to the public 
interest, but a violation of basic 
morality. Several other signatories felt 
that it was not clear, especially in light 
of several recent polls in the U.S., that 
legalizing euthanasia would in fact be 
contrary to the public interest. 
For decisions about patients who 
were once competent but are not now 
competent and who have not exe-
cuted an advance directive, the 
statement affirms the desirability of 
discovering in so far as possible what 
the patient would have wanted done. 
If efforts fail to reconstruct reliable 
substituted judgment, the statement 
endorses reliance on a best interest 
test (defined as "what would most 
generally be thought to advance most 
such patients' interests"). The exam- 
ples of interest it might be presumed 
"most such patients" would endorse 
omits any reference to simple con- 
tinuation of life. Indeed, the signa- 
tories specifically reject "the simple 
vitalist assumption that prolonging 
life is always in a patient's interests." 
They affirm that active euthanasia, 
"as distinguished from forgoing 
treatment that is deemed inappropri- 
ate, has no place in the treatment of 
permanently incapacitated patients." 
On the other hand, the statement 
affirms (with five dissents registered) 
that patients in a "reliably diagnosed" 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) can 
have "no self-regarding interest," and 
that life-prolonging treatment in such 
cases mav be discontinued. 
The s&tement affirms the necessity 
of setting reasonable limits in provid- 
ing life-prolonging treatment for 
patients who have never been com- 
petent, specifically endorses the 
"weighing of the ratio of benefits and 
burdens" as a tool in assessing such 
limits, and catalogues the interests 
that may conflict and may require 
protection in these decisions. How- 
ever, decisional discretion guided by 
the clinical wisdom of a trustworthy 
doctor more than any "layers of 
external mandatory audit" will be 
most valuable in interpreting those 
limits and interests and resolving 
those conflicts. 
As the signatories themselves 
acknowledged, the section addressing 
decisions influenced by scarcity is the 
document's weakest part. However, 
three very important areas of agree- 
ment appear: (1) the recognition of 
the inevitability of scarcity and the 
necessity to make choices between 
alternative uses of scarce resources, 
(2) the recognition that those choices 
should be open and undisguised, and 
(3) the endorsement of cost-
effectiveness analysis as an indispens- 
ible tool in responsibly addressing 
problems of scarcity.-John M. 
Stanley 
[Offprints of The Appleton Con- 
sensus can be obtained from John 
M. Stanley, Lawrence University 
Program in Biomedical Ethics, Box 
599, Appleton,WI 54911.] 
